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Race and the Local Politics of Punishment
in the New World of Welfare1
Richard C. Fording
University of Kentucky
Joe Soss
University of Minnesota
Sanford F. Schram
Bryn Mawr College
To illuminate how race affects the usage of punitive tools in policy
implementation settings, we analyze sanctions imposed for noncom-
pliant client behavior under welfare reform. Drawing on a model
of racial classification and policy choice, we test four hypotheses
regarding client race, local context, and sanctioning. Based on lon-
gitudinal and cross-sectional multilevel analyses of individual-level
administrative data, we find that race plays a significant role in
shaping sanction implementation. Its effects, however, are highly
contingent on client characteristics, local political contexts, and the
degree to which state governments devolve policy control to local
officials.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, poverty governance in the United States has
been transformed by the convergence of two broad reform movements.
1 We are grateful to Scott Allard, Maria Cancian, Raymond Duvall, Ken Hoover, Linda
Houser, Dana Patton, Mark Peffley, Stephen Pimpare, Frances Fox Piven, Stephen
Rathegab Smith, John Tambornino, Pamela Winston, and D. Stephen Voss for pro-
viding valuable comments on earlier drafts. This research has been supported by the
University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR); the Institute for Re-
search on Poverty (IRP) at the University of Wisconsin; the Center on Ethnicities,
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The first, often referred to as “paternalist,” has shifted governance to a
stance that is more overt in directing and supervising the behaviors of
the poor (Mead 1997). Using images of disorder and dysfunction as jus-
tifications, public authorities have asserted an obligation to “tell the poor
what to do” (Mead 1998). Thus, programs for poor people have been
recast to emphasize behavioral expectations, administrative monitoring,
incentives for right behavior, and penalties for noncompliance (Mead
1997). Means-tested benefits of various stripes, from nutritional assistance
to housing support, have been made conditional on compliant behavior.
The sharp turn toward paternalism has intersected with a second de-
velopment: the reorganization of governance along “neoliberal” lines. In
the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberal reformers initially adopted a laissez-faire
stance, seeking to reduce the state’s influence on markets through dereg-
ulation and curtailments of the welfare state (Harvey 2005). Over time,
however, they shifted to a more ambitious agenda (Peck and Tickell 2002).
Today, neoliberalism encompasses a wide range of efforts to organize social
relations according to principles of market rationality (Brown 2003).
Rather than shrinking the state, neoliberals have sought to restructure it
and harness its capacities for market purposes. They have embraced gov-
ernmental authority while working to redirect it—redesigning its opera-
tions to reflect market principles, making it more reliant on market actors,
and using it in affirmative ways to construct markets and impose market
discipline (Brown 2006).
The convergence of these two streams marks a significant moment in
American political development. Welfare programs today are adminis-
tered and implemented through a decentralized network of actors, or-
ganized by quasi-market relations, and charged with the task of bringing
discipline to the lives of the poor. Surveillance and behavioral control are,
of course, old themes in the history of poverty governance (Katz 1996).
In this respect, the new system can be seen as continuous with the long
history of efforts to regulate and modify poor people’s behaviors (Piven
and Cloward 1971; Abramovitz 1988). Yet, if the new system is less than
the sharp break with the past that some observers imagine (e.g., Mead
1998), it is also more than a simple recycling of old ideas and tactics (e.g.,
Somers and Block 2005). The present era is distinguished not by the
Communities, and Social Policy at Bryn Mawr College; and the Annie E. Casey Foun-
dation. We are grateful to representatives of the Florida Department of Children and
Families and Workforce Florida, Inc., for the data used in this article, and to Adam Butz
for valuable research assistance. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely
those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of
the UKCPR, the IRP, the state of Florida, or any agency of the federal government. Direct
correspondence to Richard C. Fording, Department of Political Science, University of Ken-
tucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 40506-0027. E-mail: rford@uky.edu
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severity of its agenda but by the ways that old and new elements operate
together as a particular system for disciplining the poor. To understand
it, one must ask how the echoes of past practice (surveillance, stigma,
regulation, etc.) intersect with new historical developments that have (1)
repositioned the state as a collaborator and contractor in performance-
driven, decentralized governing networks (Kettl 2002), (2) restructured the
relationship between welfare programs and labor markets (Krinsky 2007),
(3) redesigned welfare agencies as market operations (Ridzi 2009), (4)
pushed poverty governance toward a more carceral emphasis (Wacquant
2009), and (5) recast welfare programs as therapeutic regimes designed to
turn “welfare dependents” into competent “worker-citizens” (Schram 2000;
Korteweg 2003).
As logics of violation and punishment have become more central to
public aid programs, criminal justice and welfare policies have converged
to create a “double regulation of the poor” (Wacquant 2009). Like earlier
eras of poverty governance, the recent disciplinary turn has reflected a
complex interplay of race, class, and gender dynamics (Nelson 1990; Gor-
don 1994; Mettler 1998; Hays 2003). Indeed, the racialized system of
discipline that targets the poor today can be understood as gendered in
four senses. First, its institutions have been built, politically, around gen-
der-specific cultural images of poor racial minorities: the lawless, violent
male of the underclass ghetto (Wacquant 2009) and the lazy and licentious
welfare queen (Hancock 2004). Second, the system operates through gen-
der-segregated institutions, with women making up roughly 90% of adult
welfare recipients and men making up roughly 90% of prisoners (Haney
2004). Third, the common direction of change in welfare and criminal
operations has been toward a “masculinizing of the state” as a paternalist,
behavior-enforcing custodian (Wacquant 2009, p. 15). The “nanny state”
of welfare protections and prison rehabilitation programs has been sup-
planted by a “daddy state” emphasizing direction, supervision, and pu-
nitive modes of discipline (Starobin 1998). Fourth, historically masculine
images of the worker-citizen have been elevated and universalized as a
behavioral norm, while, at the same time, women in welfare programs
have been stripped of rights as both citizens and workers (Korteweg 2003;
Collins and Mayer 2010). For former welfare recipients and prisoners, the
sine qua non of civic reinstatement is the same: formal employment and
wage-based support of one’s children.
As decentralized disciplinary systems have moved to the forefront of
poverty governance, the study of administrative practice has taken on
greater urgency (Mead 2004). Because public benefits are now more con-
tingent on recipient behavior, local policy implementers have had to re-
organize their operations around the tasks of identifying and penalizing
rule violators. To understand discipline as an element of governance, then,
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social scientists must do more than explain why mass publics or political
jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they embrace such punitive policy
designs. We must investigate how punitive policy tools are actually put
into practice and, in so doing, clarify the social, political, economic, and
organizational forces that shape decisions to discipline. It is here, in the
operation of administrative discretion, that the state’s capacity to punish
collides with the core question of distributive politics posed by Harold
Lasswell (1936): “Who gets what, when, how?”
This article presents an analysis of discipline at the frontlines of welfare
reform, focusing on how patterns of punishment are affected by the inter-
play of race and politics. In the United States, there is a long history of
social-policy tools being applied to racial groups in unequal ways (Lie-
berman 1998; Katznelson 2005). Today, however, the age of Jim Crow is
a distant memory, de jure discrimination is banned, and norms of racial
equality are widely embraced (Mendelberg 2001). In this post–civil rights
context, how and why does race matter for disciplinary action in local
welfare offices? Under what conditions do client racial characteristics
become significant influences on decisions to impose penalties?
Since the 1960s, welfare programs have been widely understood as
“black” programs focused on poor, female-headed families in black com-
munities. Earlier eras of poor relief in the United States were marked by
the exclusion of racial minorities (Lieberman 1998) and by efforts to con-
ceal the presence of people of color in welfare caseloads (Mittelstadt 2005).
Such policy practices were particularly widespread in the South and were
facilitated by decentralized administration of welfare programs targeted
for the so-called undeserving poor (Trattner 1999). In the 1960s, however,
a turbulent decade of racial politics intersected with welfare rights activ-
ism to produce both objective and symbolic changes in the relationship
between race and welfare provision (Quadagno 1994). Welfare rights vic-
tories led to a centralization of administrative control and a significant
reduction in the amount of discretion given to frontline workers, thus
easing eligibility restrictions and weakening discriminatory practices. As
a result, the black share of women in the welfare caseload began to
increase (Piven and Cloward 1971). At the same time, media coverage of
poverty shifted toward a disproportionate emphasis on images of the black
poor, especially in stories that focused on behavioral pathologies (Gilens
1999). The public image of the “lazy and licentious welfare queen” took
center stage in debates over public assistance (Hancock 2004). These de-
velopments were strengthened by the racialized rhetoric that opportunistic
political elites deployed in using welfare dependence and underclass pa-
thology as electoral wedge issues (Neubeck and Cazenave 2001).
As a result, numerous studies confirm that racial attitudes operate today
as a key determinant of public preferences regarding social programs and
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systems of punishment (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Gilens
1999; Dyck and Hussey 2008). Likewise, studies suggest that as respon-
sibility for welfare provision has shifted back to state and local govern-
ments in the wake of welfare reform, punitive policy tools have been
adopted in a pattern that tracks with the racial composition of state
populations (Hero 1998; Soss et al. 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002;
Fording 2003; Fellowes and Rowe 2004). While such evidence testifies to
the enduring power of race in American politics, this evidence has limited
value for understanding if or how race matters when disciplinary policies
actually get applied to individuals in implementation settings.
To illuminate the relationship between race and the application of pu-
nitive policy tools, we analyze sanction patterns in the Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF) program. When federal lawmakers
passed welfare reform in 1996, they required states to develop procedures
for sanctioning TANF clients. Sanctions are penalties that suspend all or
part of a family’s benefits for failing to comply with a program require-
ment. Although they have existed as a policy tool in the welfare domain
for many years, they have taken on a more central programmatic role
since 1996, as clients have confronted stricter work obligations, narrower
exemption criteria, expanded behavioral requirements, and stronger pen-
alties for noncompliance (Hasenfeld, Ghose, and Larson 2004). Sanctions
impose highly visible, direct material consequences for behavioral in-
fractions. They provide the primary mode of disciplinary action in state
TANF programs and, as such, are among the most potent tools that case
managers have for influencing client behaviors and pursuing performance
goals.
Prior research has shown that states have been significantly more likely
to adopt the strictest TANF sanction policies if they have higher pro-
portions of nonwhite recipients (Soss et al. 2001; Fellowes and Rowe 2004).
In addition, a casual inspection of government records suggests that such
racial dynamics may characterize the sanction implementation process as
well. Using data from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),
one can examine the relationship between the racial composition of the
welfare caseload and sanction usage in the states that have adopted the
strictest sanction policies. Doing so, we find a strong relationship between
the percentage of TANF recipients who are black or Latino and the extent
to which states impose sanctions (see fig. 1). Figure 1 suggests a relation-
ship between race and sanctioning outcomes, yet these aggregate state-
level data are extremely limited. They do not allow us to determine if
states are actually sanctioning black and Latino recipients more often
than whites, and they tell us nothing about how, when, and why client
race might matter for the use of penalties under welfare reform. Indeed,
national data on TANF adults reveal that, compared to whites, black
The New World of Welfare
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Fig. 1.—Scatterplot of the relationship between the racial/ethnic composition of the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) caseload and the work-related sanction
rate, FY2002. Note: The sample for this analysis consists of the 14 states that enforced
immediate, full-family sanctions in 2002. The horizontal axis is computed as the sum of
the percentage of TANF families that are African-American and the percentage that are
Latino, based on data reported for April 2002. The vertical axis is the percentage of cases
closed due to a work-related sanction during fiscal year 2002. These data are reported
in the Sixth Annual Report to Congress, published by the Office of Family Assistance in
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
ofa/annualreport6/ar6index.htm).
TANF clients tend to have less education, lower earnings, and are more
likely to suffer from mental and physical challenges that make it more
difficult for black clients to meet TANF work requirements. Thus, to
properly investigate the effect of race on sanction decisions, one must
examine individual-level data within a research design that maximizes
our ability to understand if and why racial disparities exist in sanction
implementation.
Drawing on a general model of racial classification and policy choice,
we begin our investigation by developing the logic underlying four hy-
potheses regarding client race and sanctioning in the TANF program. We
then proceed to test our hypotheses by using two complementary data
sets. We begin with an analysis of longitudinal data on TANF clients
from the state of Florida’s Welfare Transition (WT) program, a highly
decentralized welfare-to-work program funded by the TANF block grant.
As the centerpiece of federal welfare reform in 1996, state TANF programs
have been at the heart of the recent turn toward paternalist social policy.
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The Florida WT program, in turn, has been at the leading edge of state
efforts to use sanctions as a tool to motivate behavioral compliance and
change (see fig. 1). Based on a series of longitudinal, multilevel analyses
of individual-level administrative data, we find race to play a significant
role in sanction implementation; however, the effect is highly contingent
on client characteristics and the local political context.
One important explanation for the effect of race in Florida, we argue,
is the highly decentralized setting in which sanctions are implemented.
Yet, it is impossible to test this hypothesis by examining data from Florida
alone. For this reason, we supplement our analysis of the timing of sanc-
tions in Florida with a cross-sectional analysis of TANF sanctioning that
relies on a national data set. Such an analysis allows a direct test of the
mediating role of administrative decentralization on the effect of race,
while also allowing us to provide a partial replication of our results from
Florida. Among the states in which TANF is administered by local gov-
ernments, our findings are largely consistent and suggest that race has
played an important role in sanction implementation; however, once again
this effect is conditioned by the local political environment. Where TANF
administration is more centralized, we find race to be unrelated to sanc-
tioning. In sum, our findings buttress prior research that demonstrates
how race has influenced the rolling out of a more disciplinary regime of
U.S. poverty governance, both across the states (Soss, Fording, and
Schram 2008) and by frontline case managers (Schram et al. 2009).
POLITICS, CHOICE, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
TANF SANCTIONS
A variety of studies have used administrative or survey data to analyze
the client characteristics that correlate with a higher likelihood of being
sanctioned. Their findings converge on the conclusion that sanctioned
participants tend to resemble long-term welfare participants across a va-
riety of characteristics such as marital status, age, family size, education
level, job experience, and most importantly for our purposes, race (Koralek
2000; Westra and Routely 2000; Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Kalil, See-
feldt, and Wang 2002; Pavetti, Derr, and Hesketh 2003; Hasenfeld et al.
2004; Wu et al. 2006).
The existing literature is creative and sophisticated in its use of econ-
ometric methods. Yet it is also limited by its attention to only one side of
a two-sided transaction. With only a few exceptions (e.g., Keiser, Meuser,
and Choi 2004), previous studies have trained their attention on clients
and asked, at least implicitly, Who is likely to get sanctioned? As a result,
these studies largely ignore the fact that welfare sanctions arise not just
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from client characteristics and behaviors but also from policy choices
made by a series of political actors, such as state and local representatives,
program directors, supervisors, and case managers. The rate and incidence
of sanctioning depend, at least in part, on the decisions such actors make
as they set policy, organize administrative practice, and apply general
rules to specific instances. In short, research to date has largely failed to
address sanctions as tools of governance that may or may not be deployed
depending on what officials choose in particular jurisdictions and cases.
The sanctions deployed at the frontlines of welfare agencies are products
of choice at numerous levels of governance. Under federal welfare reform,
states confronted a range of options in designing their sanction policies.
By the late 1990s, 17 adopted “immediate full-family sanctions,” which
suspend all benefits for all members of the TANF family as penalty for
the first instance of noncompliance. Fifteen chose “gradual full-family
sanctions,” which can eventually rise to a “full-family” impact but only
after a progression of penalties. The remaining states selected “partial
sanctions,” which reduce only a portion—typically the adult portion—of
the family’s benefits (Pavetti et al. 2003). Studies suggest that these choices
have been quite consequential, and, as a result, the decline in the welfare
caseload has been as much as 25% greater in states with immediate full-
family sanctions compared to states with the least punitive sanction pol-
icies (Rector and Youseff 1999).
The politics of policy choice is equally crucial at the local level, where
a variety of officials hold responsibility for interpreting state sanction
policy and specifying it through rule making. Many state governments
have practiced “second-order devolution,” where primary authority over
TANF policy has been devolved to county government officials or regional
workforce boards (Gainesborough 2003). In all states, however, local
TANF officials are likely to have substantial discretion over program
elements that affect the rate and incidence of sanctioning. Their local
policy choices typically establish the process by which clients are informed
of TANF rules and penalty procedures; the mode of monitoring partici-
pation in required activities; the steps for initiating a sanction, including
how and when clients are notified of an impending sanction and the steps
needed to avoid it; and the procedures and requirements for “curing” a
sanction and returning a client to the TANF rolls. Not surprisingly, given
the wide scope of this discretion, field studies find that, even when TANF
offices operate under the same state guidelines, sanction philosophies and
practices vary dramatically across local communities (Pavetti et al. 1998).
State and local policy choices combine to create the settings for more
proximate decision processes in the interactions between case managers
and clients. As frontline workers, case managers exercise significant dis-
cretion in interpreting program rules and applying penalties (Pavetti et
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al. 2003, p. 6; Meyers et al. 2006). Their decisions can influence sanction
patterns in a variety of ways. From the outset, case managers are re-
sponsible for assessing client needs and capabilities. They identify which
clients should be relieved of certain work requirements or told to attend
special classes. In doing so, the case manager establishes particular sanc-
tioning parameters for particular clients. And, of course, it is the case
manager who must decide ultimately whether to initiate sanction pro-
cedures in response to an infraction and whether the circumstances of the
infraction justify a “good cause” exception to the rules.
The exercise of discretion by case managers is enhanced by the relative
ineffectiveness of traditional monitoring strategies. Case managers rarely
operate under the direct watch of supervisors (Prottas 1979), and they
process cases at rates that make continual consultation impractical (May-
nard-Moody and Musheno 2003). While general rules do place broad limits
on case managers, they cannot be designed to cover all conceivable situ-
ations. Finally, political economy approaches to social work theory argue
that welfare clients occupy a dependent position in a relationship defined
by unequal control of power resources (Hasenfeld 1987). Under the TANF
program, moreover, clients have lost entitlement status as well as some
formal rights of appeal—developments that seem likely to have further
weakened clients’ abilities to impose limits on caseworker discretion (Mink
2002).
Recognizing the weakness of these constraints, most scholars agree that
“discretion is inevitable” in street-level work (Maynard-Moody and Mush-
eno 2000, p. 329) and may be influenced by two sets of factors. On the
one hand, the personal values of frontline workers are likely to play a
significant role in the many choices and decisions that they make during
the implementation process. However, the exercise of discretion may also
be influenced by values and incentives reflected in the organizational
culture. This is especially likely to be an important factor to consider in
understanding the implementation of TANF sanctions, due to the wide-
spread emphasis on caseload reduction and work participation and the
organizational pressures to realize these goals in the new performance-
driven system (Ridzi 2004; Soss, Fording, and Schram, in press).2 In short,
sanctions can be understood not just as events that happen to some clients
2 Based on our field research in Florida, we find that performance measurement has
had a profound effect on the organizational culture of the local welfare bureaucracy.
Indeed, our interviews with case managers and administrators reveal tremendous
pressure to meet performance benchmarks, which has likely led to a strong emphasis
on sanctions as a tool for regulating client behavior. In addition, the evidence suggests
that this emphasis on discipline may have come at the expense of client needs and has
likely led to an exacerbation of race and class disparities in sanctioning and client
well-being (Soss et al., in press).
The New World of Welfare
1619
more than others (as in most of the current literature) but also as outcomes
of governmental decision-making processes. From this perspective, the
analytic focus shifts from an investigation of client characteristics per se
to an investigation of how client characteristics become relevant to ad-
ministrative decisions and interact with the environmental forces that
systematically shape administrative behavior. In what follows, we pursue
exactly this approach, investigating how client racial characteristics com-
bine with stereotype-consistent cues, local political environments, and
decentralized administrative structures to influence frontline decisions to
impose sanctions.
RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND THE LOCAL POLITICS OF
PUNISHMENT
Our analysis is based on a simple but general model of social policy choice
called the racial classification model (RCM). The RCM draws Schneider
and Ingram’s (1993, 1997) work on the social construction of target pop-
ulations together with models of implicit racism (Quillian 2008) to clarify
the unconscious ways that racial schemas can guide interpretation and
choice. The RCM specifies conditions that can produce policy-based racial
disparities even in the absence of overt racial animus or discriminatory
intent. In this sense, it is a minimalist cognitive model of policy decision
making that focuses on the necessity of social classification and the re-
sulting consequences of group reputation. The RCM does not preclude
the operation of overt prejudice. Rather, it suggests how implicit cognitive
processes function to produce racial disparities even in circumstances
where overt prejudice and discriminatory intent are not observed. Here,
we apply the model to policy implementation settings by deriving four
hypotheses regarding TANF sanctions. The RCM consists of three basic
premises (see Soss et al. 2008):
1. To be effective in designing policies and applying policy tools to
specific target groups, policy actors must rely on salient social classi-
fications and group reputations; without such classifications, they would
be unable to bring coherence to a complex social world or determine
appropriate action.
2. When racial minorities are salient in a policy context, race will be
more likely to provide a salient basis for social classification of targets
and, hence, to signify target differences perceived as relevant to the
accomplishment of policy goals.
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3. The likelihood of racially patterned policy outcomes will be posi-
tively associated with the degree of policy-relevant contrast in policy
actors’ perceptions of racial groups. The degree of contrast, in turn,
will be a function of (a) the prevailing cultural stereotypes of racial
groups, (b) the extent to which policy actors hold relevant group ste-
reotypes, and (c) the presence or absence of stereotype-consistent cues.
Although policy actors are surely guided by many motives, the RCM
suggests that they generally try to choose courses of action that they expect
to be effective in light of what they believe about the specific groups they
aim to address. In this process, social group characteristics can serve as
proxies for more detailed information about a policy’s intended target
group. When race is salient to a policy area, as in the case of welfare
(Gilens 1999), racial classifications can serve precisely this function, re-
gardless of whether racial animus is present and regardless of the decision
maker’s own racial identity. In such cases, group reputations can frame
interpretations of ambiguous policy-target behaviors and cue assumptions
about the kinds of policy actions that are likely to be effective. The effects
of a particular group reputation, however, will depend on the policy rel-
evance of its contents and on situational factors that may strengthen or
weaken its utility as an information proxy (Schram et al. 2009).
In applying the RCM to TANF sanction decisions, we conceptualize
sanctions as tools for motivating welfare clients, stimulating work effort,
and enforcing responsible behavior.3 Accordingly, local policy actors
should be more likely to organize and implement sanctions in a stringent
fashion when TANF clients are perceived as less motivated and respon-
sible in their own right—that is, when clients are perceived as needing a
stronger external stimulus to follow program rules and achieve welfare-
to-work goals. In this context, client race should affect sanctioning pat-
terns to the extent that contrasts between racial-group reputations convey
information about motivation, work effort, and personal responsibility.
Combining these assumptions with research on group stereotypes in
the United States, we can derive our first hypothesis from the RCM.
Relative to white Americans, black Americans remain strongly associated
3 We do not mean to suggest that sanctions are necessarily effective in achieving these
goals, although the existing research does suggest that full-family sanctions (compared
to partial sanctions) are more likely to promote work exits and caseload decline (for
a review of this research, see Pavetti et al. [2003]; Meyers et al. [2006]). Rather, we
assume that case managers and welfare administrators believe that sanctions are ef-
fective at achieving these goals. Of course, these goals have very little to do with client
well-being and self-sufficiency. Indeed, the research on this question suggests that if
sanctions have any effect on well-being, the effect is negative (Pavetti et al. 2003;
Meyers et al. 2006).
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with low work effort and motivation, socially irresponsible behavior, and
preferences for welfare reliance (Schuman et al. 1997; Gilens 1999). Ste-
reotypes of Latinos occupy a midpoint, less negative than blacks but more
negative than whites (Fox 2004).4 Accordingly, the RCM suggests:
Hypothesis 1.—Simple disparity hypothesis: all else equal, TANF of-
ficials will be more likely to sanction black clients than white or Latino
clients and more likely to sanction Latino clients than white clients.
As a baseline hypothesis, hypothesis 1 suggests that client race will have
a significant and equivalent effect in all circumstances. Because adult men
make up such a small percentage of welfare recipients, the most relevant
group contrasts here focus on images of white, black, and Latino poor
women. As students of intersectionality have rightly emphasized, the cul-
tural images that attach to such compound identities often deviate in
significant ways from the stereotypes that surround a single axis of social
stratification, such as gender or race taken alone (Collins 2005; McCall
2005; Hancock 2007; Strolovitch 2007). In the welfare context, arguably
the most powerful “controlling images” have focused on poor black
women, portraying them as sexually promiscuous jezebels and as mam-
mies who are expected to work outside their own families but tend to
shirk their responsibilities when left to their own devices (Hancock 2004;
Collins 2005; Jordan-Zachery 2008). Indeed, in an analysis of survey data
reported elsewhere, we find that sexual stereotypes of black women in-
fluence public attitudes toward welfare policy in ways that stereotypes of
black men do not (Soss et al., in press).
The third proposition of the RCM, however, suggests that such con-
trolling images should have contingent rather than invariant effects, with
the impact of client race depending on both the degree to which policy
actors hold relevant group stereotypes and the presence or absence of
particular stereotype-consistent cues (regarding laziness, sexual promis-
cuity, or other prominent stereotypes regarding subgroups of welfare re-
cipients). These elements of the RCM allow us to move beyond simple
disparities to specify and test more nuanced hypotheses. As intersection-
ality research underscores, two individuals who are perceived as members
of the same racial group—even if they are both women—may nevertheless
be associated with quite different group reputations. Social cognition re-
searchers have shown that perceivers tend to distinguish “subtypes” of
racial groups (such as “ghetto blacks” vs. “black businessmen”) and to
attribute negative global-group traits to these subtypes to very different
degrees (Devine and Baker 1991; Richards and Hewstone 2001). As a
4 We restrict our attention to white, black, and Latino welfare recipients due to the
fact that, in our data sample, sizes are too small for other racial and ethnic groups at
the county level.
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result, race-of-target effects will often be contingent on additional char-
acteristics that strengthen or weaken the individual’s connection to the
group’s prevailing reputation. Eberhardt and colleagues (2006), for ex-
ample, find that black defendants convicted of killing white victims are
more likely to receive the death penalty if they are perceived as having
a “stereotypically black appearance.”
Prior research suggests that a variety of stereotype-consistent cues can
enhance race-based disadvantages. In some instances, this effect functions
to widen already-existing racial disparities. In others, it creates disparities
where none had otherwise existed. The former scenario is well illustrated
by Pager’s (2003) influential field experiment exploring the effects of race
and “the mark of a criminal record” on hiring outcomes. Pager (2003)
finds that black job applicants are already disadvantaged relative to
whites in the no-felony condition of her experiment, yet the attribution
of a felony conviction actually reduces black applicants’ job prospects to
a greater degree than the prospects of already-advantaged white appli-
cants. By contrast, the latter scenario is illustrated by a recent study of
how racial cues affect preferences for political candidates. Valentino,
Hutchings, and White (2002, p. 86) find that “when the black racial cues
are stereotype-inconsistent, the relationship between racial attitudes and
the vote disappears. . . . [Likewise] the presence of black images alone
. . . does not prime negative racial attitudes. . . . The effect emerges only
when the pairing of the visuals with the narrative subtly reinforces neg-
ative stereotypes in the mind of the viewer.”
Building on this research, the RCM suggests that, regardless of whether
simple racial disparities exist, the presence of a trait that is consistent
with stereotypes of poor minority women should increase the odds of a
sanction more for minority clients than for white clients. In the present
analysis, perhaps the most relevant trait of this sort is long-term welfare
usage (Gilens 1999). For several decades now, welfare “dependency” has
been a prominent stereotype associated with poor racial minorities—in-
terpreted in various quarters as a distinguishing feature of “underclass”
culture, a pathology akin to addiction, and a clear sign of an individual’s
unwillingness to work (Schram 1995). This image has been particularly
salient for poor black women in welfare programs, whose “laziness and
dependence” have been portrayed as a civic failure as well as an abdication
of maternal responsibility (Hancock 2004; Mead 2005). To stay on the
welfare rolls for a comparatively long period is, in the context of welfare-
to-work programs, to mark oneself in a policy-relevant and racially in-
flected way. Accordingly, the RCM suggests:
Hypothesis 2.—Time-contingent disparity hypothesis: the effects of
race on sanctioning will grow stronger, and, thus, the racial disparities
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predicted under hypothesis 1 will grow larger, as TANF participation spells
increase in length.
The third premise of the RCM predicts that the production of racial
disparities will also be contingent on the extent to which policy actors
hold relevant group stereotypes. When such stereotypes are viewed with
skepticism, racial-group reputations will be perceived as poor proxies for
more detailed information and, hence, as unreliable guides to decisions
regarding policy targets. By contrast, when such stereotypes are accepted
as largely valid, differences in group reputation should convey more useful
information and, thus, the likelihood of racially patterned outcomes should
increase.
Ideally, one would test this component of the RCM by utilizing direct
measures of stereotype acceptance at the individual level. In the absence
of such measures, one must seek out a suitable proxy by asking where in
American society one is likely to find greater acceptance of stereotypes
regarding racial-group orientations toward work and welfare. As an em-
pirical matter, one answer to this question is that such stereotypes are
more likely to be found in politically conservative communities than in
politically liberal communities. There is, of course, no logical reason why
conservatives should hold more negative views of racial minorities. In-
deed, there are good reasons to distinguish between the two when trying
to explain public opposition to various policies designed to advance egal-
itarian goals (Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). Nevertheless, two basic
empirical observations emerge as uncontroversial in the existing literature.
First, conservatives are more likely than liberals to oppose welfare and
to hold negative views of welfare recipients (Cook and Barrett 1992; Gilens
1999). Second, conservatives are more likely than liberals to hold negative
stereotypes of African-Americans, especially in assessing the degree to
which blacks and Latinos are “lazy” compared to other racial groups
(Glaser 1994; Johnson and Marini 1998; Gilens 1999; Oliver and Men-
delberg 2000; Domke 2001; Federico and Sidanius 2002).
This relationship can be easily documented with data from the National
Election Study (NES). In recent years, the NES has asked respondents
to evaluate the degree to which different racial and ethnic groups (in-
cluding blacks, Latinos, and whites) were either “hard working” or “lazy”
(on a seven-point scale). We first computed a measure of the black-white
and Latino-white “stereotype gap” by subtracting the laziness score for
whites from the black and Latino scores, respectively. We then regressed
the stereotype gap for each minority group on a measure of conservatism.
The predicted regression line from these two bivariate regressions is plot-
ted in figure 2, based on pooled NES data from 1996, 2000, and 2004.5
5 Supplementary analysis finds that the relationship between the black and Latino
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Fig. 2.—Average gap in perceived laziness of racial groups, by ideological identification
of respondents. Note: The vertical axis is the stereotype gap and is computed as the difference
in the mean assessment of laziness for each pair of target groups (the mean score for blacks/
Latinos minus the mean score for whites), where the laziness scale is coded as follows: 1p
hardworking, 7 p lazy. As scaled, the stereotype gap is a measure of the degree to which
respondents view blacks (or Latinos) as lazier than whites. The measure of conservatism is
computed as the feeling thermometer score for conservatives minus the score for liberals.
The lines in the graph represent the predicted relationship between conservatism and the
stereotype gap for each group, based on a bivariate regression that utilizes pooled data from
the National Election Study (1996, 2000, 2004). Each slope value is statistically significant
(P !.01).
The results are clear. Conservatives are more likely than liberals or
moderates to view blacks and Latinos as lazy, compared to whites. As a
result, the perceived gap between group reputations grows consistently
larger as one shifts from the liberal to the conservative end of the ideo-
logical spectrum. One need not engage the thorny causal questions of why
this relationship exists to pursue our present analytic goals. It suffices to
say that there is an empirical basis for assuming that, in more conservative
political environments, one is more likely to find negative views of welfare
stereotype gaps and conservatism is robust across different time periods and regions
of the United States. The data necessary to conduct this analysis are unavailable in
the NES prior to 1996. However, we were able to use General Social Survey (GSS)
data to estimate the relationship between the black and Latino stereotype gaps and a
simpler measure of conservatism for all GSS years since 1990. The results are consistent
with the analyses presented in fig. 2. We also estimated the relationship separately for
each of the four census regions. For blacks, the relationship is relatively stable and
statistically significant in each of the four census regions. For Latinos, the relationship
is statistically significant in the South and West regions at the .05 level and close to
significance in the Northeast and North Central regions. These results are summarized
in appendix tables A1–A11 and figs. A1–A5 in the online edition of the journal.
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reliance and acceptance of stereotypes asserting that racial minorities dif-
fer from whites in preferring welfare over work.
Combining this observation with the RCM leads to the expectation that
racial disparities in sanctioning will be larger in more politically conser-
vative communities. A variety of mechanisms may underlie this relation-
ship. Because case managers tend to be drawn from local communities,
one would expect them to be more conservative (and, hence, more likely
to perceive racial-group differences in welfare-work orientations) when
their offices are located in more conservative environments. The same
selection dynamics are likely to operate for TANF supervisors, program
directors, and governing-board members. As a result, racial disparities in
sanctioning may arise more often in conservative communities, not only
due to the attitudes of individual case managers but also because racial
classifications have guided the more senior officials who set local operating
procedures and manage TANF implementation. Finally, because welfare
agencies are “open systems” that must respond to their political environ-
ments (Meier 1993), conservative and liberal communities may produce
different patterns of program implementation because of the ways that
racialized understandings inform political pressures, standards of legiti-
macy, and agendas for action. For all these reasons, the RCM suggests:
Hypothesis 3.—Ideology-contingent disparity hypothesis: the effects
of race on sanctioning will be stronger, and, thus, the racial disparities
predicted under hypothesis 1 will be larger, in conservative political en-
vironments.
Finally, we offer a fourth hypothesis which predicts that the causal
mechanisms assumed by the RCM will have the strongest effect on im-
plementation outcomes in administrative environments that offer greater
discretion to local decision makers and frontline workers. As discussed
above, many states have devolved significant authority in TANF imple-
mentation to local governments or regional workforce boards—a process
known as second-order devolution (SOD) (Gainsborough 2003). Under
SOD, states grant administrative authority to local governments just as
the federal government grants authority and responsibility to state gov-
ernments in designing and implementing TANF (Nathan 1996; Adkisson
1998). Although the division of state-local responsibility varies across SOD
states, it is generally agreed that in SOD states, local TANF administrators
and frontline staff enjoy greater freedom from state control and thus have
the opportunity to exercise significantly greater discretion in TANF im-
plementation (Fording, Soss, and Schram 2007). Therefore, racial clas-
sifications may have more room to influence local decision making in SOD
states, raising the odds of racial disparities in sanctioning outcomes. This
leads to our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.—Decentralization-contingent disparity hypothesis: the
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effects of race on sanctioning will be stronger, and, thus, the racial dis-
parities predicted under hypothesis 1 will be larger, in states that have
chosen to engage in second-order devolution.
To date, we are aware of only one study that has examined the effects
of both race and the political environment on TANF sanctioning. Keiser,
Meuser, and Choi (2004) analyze administrative data on sanctioning in
Missouri, finding that after one controls for relevant client-level and
county-level factors, blacks are, on average, 23% more likely to be sanc-
tioned than white recipients. Moreover, the authors find that the mag-
nitude of racial differences varies across seven geographic regions in a
pattern that they interpret as politically meaningful. Yet, as a test of the
RCM’s predictions, Keiser and colleagues’ analysis has significant limi-
tations.
Because of small sample sizes, the authors could only examine how
racial effects varied across a small number of geographic groupings
(seven), all of which were defined at a high level of aggregation and some
of which were noncontiguous. As a result, they were unable to test whether
differences in racial effects correlated with any direct measure of political
ideology (hypothesis 3). In addition, because Keiser and colleagues relied
on binary logit analysis rather than event history analysis, they were
unable to test hypotheses related to spell length (hypothesis 2), and their
analysis of racial disparities offered only a limited ability to control for
differences in at-risk periods across groups (see Wu et al. 2006). Finally,
by examining a single state operating in a centralized administrative en-
vironment, not only is their analysis limited in external validity, it cannot
test for differences in racial effects due to variation in administrative
decentralization (hypothesis 4).
Our analysis follows Keiser, Mueser, and Choi (2004) in that we examine
the individual and contextual determinants of sanctioning using admin-
istrative data. However, we build on their analysis in several important
ways. First, by examining sanctioning in the state of Florida, where the
minority population is not only sizable but widely dispersed, we are able
to examine racial effects across a large number of geographic contexts at
a lower level of aggregation that is both administratively and politically
meaningful (the county). As a result, we can directly test the interaction
of local political ideology and client racial characteristics. Second, because
Florida is a racially diverse state, we are able to examine disparities in
sanctioning across blacks, whites, and Latinos. Third, by modeling sanc-
tions using an event history design, we are able to control for group
differences in at-risk periods and directly test the hypothesis that racial
disparities will grow across the length of the welfare spell. And, finally,
by extending our analysis to national data on TANF sanctions, we are
not only able to test for the effects of administrative decentralization but
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we are able to provide a level of external validity that is absent in prior
studies of sanctioning.
RACE AND SANCTIONING IN THE FLORIDA TANF PROGRAM: AN
ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
We have selected the Florida WT program for our study, not because it
is typical of all state TANF programs but because it provides close to an
ideal setting for analyzing how race and politics affect local differences
in the use of penalties. Since 1996, Florida, as a practitioner of “second-
order devolution,” has constructed one of the most decentralized TANF
programs in the country. Frontline services have been contracted out to
public, nonprofit, and for-profit providers throughout the state, and pri-
mary authority over the WT program has shifted down to 24 local public/
private “regional workforce boards” (RWBs). These RWBs are responsible
for strategic planning, policy development, contracting, and oversight of
local one-stop delivery systems. Several of the regions encompass more
than one county, and the regional boards set policy in a way that allows
for county offices to have some discretion in implementing policies. The
regional boards are overseen not by state agencies but by a statewide
public/private partnership called Workforce Florida, Inc. (WFI). The Flor-
ida Department of Children and Families (DCF), a conventional state
agency, receives the federal TANF block grant and maintains responsi-
bility for eligibility determination. But otherwise, Florida stands out
among American states for its emphasis on local control and privatization
within a work-oriented TANF program (Botsko, Snyder, and Leos-Urbel
2001, p. 7).
Florida also scores high on factors that raise the importance of sanction
decision processes. After 1996, Florida adopted “some of the strictest time
limits and work requirements in the nation” and broadened the pool of
clients subject to sanctions by creating “few possibilities for exemptions”
(Botsko et al. 2001, p. 4). The sanctions themselves also fall at the strong
end of the continuum, resulting in an immediate, full-family loss of TANF
benefits and a reduction of food stamp benefits to the fullest extent per-
mitted by federal law (Botsko et al. 2001, p. 6). Moreover, as we can see
in figure 1, Florida employs sanctions at an extremely high rate compared
to other states with full-family sanctions.
The selection of Florida also aids our analysis because it offers signif-
icant variation on the two most critical independent variables in our study:
race and local political environment. Florida is one of the most racially
diverse states in the country, with sizable black and Latino populations,
and the state’s TANF population displays even more diversity. Between
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January 2000 and March 2004, 36.2% of TANF adults were black, 33.7%
were white (non-Latino), and 28.5% were Latino. In addition, Florida is
a politically diverse state, a fact clearly reflected in recent presidential
elections. In combination with Florida’s heavy emphasis on sanctioning
and decentralized approach to welfare provision, this variation in race
and ideology provides an ideal setting for a study of the joint effects of
race and ideology on local sanction implementation.
Data and Methods
Our sample consists of individual-level administrative data for all new
adult TANF clients who entered WT during the 24-month period from
January 2001 through December 2002, supplemented with contextual data
indicating how local implementing environments vary across the state’s
67 counties.6 Thus, our entire period of analysis extends from January
2001 (first cohort enters) through November 2003 (12th month of spell
for last cohort). We follow each of the 24 cohorts for up to a maximum
of 12 consecutive months, ending our observations of the case at the spell’s
termination or at the 12-month mark, whichever comes first. We restrict
our attention to the first TANF spell for each individual during this period,
defined based on continuous months of TANF receipt. As defined, and
accounting for cases for which values on some variables are missing, our
total sample size includes approximately 70,000 individuals who were
subject to over 26,000 sanctions across approximately 200,000 person-
month observations.7
As our data consist of variables that are measured at two levels of
analysis (individual and county), we examine the determinants of sanction
usage by employing a discrete-time multilevel event history analysis of
the initiation of a sanction (Barber et al. 2000). Our dependent variable
is Sanctiontjk—a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not client
j, residing in county k, has been sanctioned in month t. We estimate our
model using the logit link (i.e., as a hierarchical generalized linear model,
or HGLM), and therefore the effects of the independent variables are
6 We define “new” TANF clients as those clients who have spent at least 12 continuous
months without TANF benefits.
7 We are missing data on the age of TANF children (7% of cases) and for the education
level of TANF adults (29% of adults). Yet, a comparison of sanction rates of missing
and nonmissing cases finds the difference to be trivial (38.1% for nonmissing cases,
37.3% for missing cases), and therefore we are not concerned that the omission of these
cases has led to significant bias in our statistical estimates. In addition, we find relatively
little difference between missing and nonmissing cases for most independent variables
as well. A more detailed comparison of missing and nonmissing cases for our Florida
sample is included in the online appendix.
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additive and represent the change in the log odds of sanction. The in-
dependent variables include individual-level measures capturing client
effects and county-level measures capturing community-context effects.8
The individual-level (level 1) model is represented below in equation (1):
Sanction p b  b Black  b Latinotjk 0k 1k j 2k j
b (Black #Month of Spell ),3k j tj
b (Latino #Month of Spell ) b No. Children (2) ,4k j tj 5k j
b No. Children (3 or more)6k j
b Age of Youngest Child (3 mos.–2 yrs.) ,7k j
b Age of Youngest Child (3–4 yrs.)8k j
b Age of Youngest Child (5–11 yrs.) ,9k j
b Age of Youngest Child (12 yrs.or more) (1)10k j
b Education (H.S.)  b Education (1 H.S.) ,11k j 12k j
b Male  b Citizen  b Age  b SingleParent13k j 14k j 15k j 16k j
b Earned Income  b Month 2 ,17k j 18k tj
b Month 3  b Month 4  b Month 519k tj 20k tj 21k tj
b Month 6  b Month 7  b Month 8 ,22k tj 23k tj 24k tj
b Month 9  b Month 10  b Month 1125k tj 26k tj 27k tj
b Month 12 .28k tj
An important feature of a multilevel model is that the coefficients for
the level 1 variables (the bs in eq. [1]) are permitted to vary across our
level 2 units (counties). Based on theoretical expectations, the county-level
variables therefore enter the level 2 model as explanatory variables for
these effects. Our level 2 model is reflected below in equations (2)–(5) and
reflects our theoretical expectations concerning the effects of county-level
variables on the intercept ( ) of equation (1) (i.e., the mean rate of sanc-b0k
tioning across counties) and on the slope values for Black and Latino (i.e.,
and ):b b1k 2k
8 We provide detailed variable descriptions, including data sources and descriptive
statistics, for each variable used in the analyses that follow in the online appendix.
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b p g  g Local Conservatism  g %Black0k 00 01 k 02 k
g %Latino  g Annual Wage03 k 04 k (2)
g Unemployment Rate  g Poverty Rate05 k 06 k
g Population  g TANF Caseload ,07 j 08 j
b p g  g Local Conservatism  e , (3)1k 00 01 k 1k
b p g  g Local Conservatism  e , (4)2k 00 01 k 2k
b p g for pp 3 28. (5)pk p0,
Level 1 Hypotheses
To test the simple disparity hypothesis, we classify clients as belonging
to one of three mutually exclusive racial/ethnic group combinations: black,
Latino, and white (non-Latino).9 We then include the dichotomous var-
iables Black and Latino in our model of sanction initiation, where we
expect the coefficient values in equation (1) will be positive for each of
these variables (b1, b2 1 0), and the coefficient for Black will be larger
than the coefficient for Latino (b1 1 b2). We test the time-contingent dis-
parity hypothesis by including two interaction terms in equation (1), Black
# Month of Spell and Latino # Month of Spell, where we expect that
the coefficients for these variables will be positive (b3, b4 1 0).
Based on past research on sanctions and welfare implementation, we
include a number of other variables to control for variation in clients’
individual characteristics. These include variables measuring the client’s
sex (Male), citizenship status (Citizen), and age (Age). The age of the
youngest child in the TANF family is measured by a series of categorical
variables, as is the number of children in the TANF family. We include
the client’s marital status (Single Parent), and two indicators of human
capital (Earned Income and Education). All of these variables have been
found to be important determinants of individual sanctioning outcomes
in past research (Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Kalil et al. 2002; Hasenfeld
et al. 2004; Wu et al. 2006).
Finally, we include a series of dummy variables for each month of the
spell to model the baseline hazard of sanction. This strategy has the
advantage of leaving the shape of the baseline hazard function unspecified,
9 We omit a very small percentage (!2%) of cases classified as “other race” by the state.
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which in this sense is analogous to the continuous-time formulation of
the Cox proportional hazards model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).
Level 2 Hypotheses
We model the intercept of equation (1) (b0k) as a function of several dif-
ferent features of local political, economic, and social environments. Due
to the theoretical importance of local ideology for our analysis, we rely
on two alternative measurement strategies. First, for each of Florida’s 67
counties we coded election results for 18 ideologically relevant constitu-
tional amendments that appeared on the ballot throughout the entire state
between 1996 and 2004. Based on a factor analysis of support for all 18
amendments, we used factor scores to create an index of county conser-
vatism that runs from zero (most liberal county) to one (most conservative
county). This index is labeled Local Conservatism and serves as our pri-
mary measure of the local political environment in Florida. As an alter-
native measure, we rely on the Republican share of the two-party pres-
idential vote, averaged over three presidential elections (1996, 2000, and
2004). Because partisanship tends to be imperfectly related to political
ideology (Miller 1999), we believe our amendment-based measure to be
a more valid measure of local ideology. However, as we describe below,
our key results are consistent regardless of the indicator we use, enhancing
our confidence in the validity of our conclusions.10
In addition to local political ideology, we consider one additional di-
mension of the local political environment: the local racial context. Pre-
vious studies have often found that racial context has a significant impact
on racially relevant policy outcomes, either through the effects of a “racial
threat” felt by the white majority (Key 1949) or the effects of increased
minority political power (Keech [1968] 1981). Because there is reason to
suspect that either effect might exist (see Keiser et al. 2004), we test for
effects of community racial composition by including the percentage of
the county population that is black and Latino, respectively (%Black,
%Latino).11
10 The simple correlation between our measure of county conservatism and our measure
of the Republican vote share is reasonably strong at .65. In addition, we have replicated
the analysis presented in fig. 2 by substituting a measure of Republican identification
for our measure of conservatism, and we find a similar (and statistically significant)
relationship. Details concerning this analysis and the construction of our amendment-
based measure of county ideology are provided in the online appendix.
11 We explored two alternative indicators to test for the effects of the local racial context
on TANF sanctioning. First, we utilized the county vote for George Wallace in the
1968 presidential campaign. Second, we used the 10-year change in the black and
Latino county population percentage. Neither of these variables proved to have an
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Several additional measures capture the effects of local labor markets
and employment opportunities, which we expect to affect sanctioning in
one of two ways. First, where employment opportunities are relatively
numerous and attractive, TANF clients may be more likely to work
enough hours to avoid falling out of compliance with TANF rules. Al-
ternatively, local labor market conditions may also influence the sanction
decisions of case managers, who may be less inclined to sanction clients
when job opportunities are less numerous or less attractive. To capture
such effects, we include the county unemployment rate (Unemployment
Rate), the county poverty rate (Poverty Rate), the level of urbanization
(as measured by county population—Population), and the annual local
wage in food service/drinking establishments (Annual Wage).
We also include a measure of the county TANF Caseload, expressed
as a proportion of the county’s population. As the caseload size increases,
we might expect, all else being equal, that administrative pressures to
reduce the caseload would result in an increase in sanctioning. Alterna-
tively, as the caseload size increases, if the number of case managers
remains fixed, individual case managers may have less time to closely
monitor TANF clients for violations of rules, thus resulting in a lower
rate of sanctioning.
Finally, we test the ideology-contingent disparity hypothesis by includ-
ing Local Conservatism as a predictor for the effects of Black (b1k) and
Latino (b2k), as reflected in equations (3) and (4). As we expect racial
disparities to increase in conservative counties, we expect Local Conser-
vatism to be positively related to the effects of Black (b1k) and Latino
(b2k), and, thus, g11 and g21 1 0.
Results
Table 1 presents results for two versions of our event history model that
differ only in the measure used to capture the local ideological environ-
ment. For each version, we report both the coefficient values and the
associated odds ratios reflecting the proportional increase in the risk of
sanction given a one-unit increase in the independent variable.
We begin by examining the dynamics of sanctioning across the TANF
spell, as reflected by the effects of the month-of-spell dummies in equation
(1) (which collectively reflect the baseline hazard of sanctioning). For ease
of interpretation, we do not report these results in tables 1 and 2 but
effect on the level of TANF sanctioning nor did either exhibit a significant interaction
with the race of the client. And perhaps most importantly for the purposes of testing
our hypothesis, the inclusion of these alternative indicators did not affect the statistical
results in any meaningful way. The results from these alternative specifications are
reported in the online appendix.
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instead present a graphical display in figure 3. The vertical axis of the
figure is the odds ratio of sanction, based on the coefficient estimates for
equation (1). Thus, for each month of the TANF spell reflected on the
horizontal in figure 3, the associated odds ratio reflects the relative odds
of sanction, compared to the initial odds at month 1, for a client who has
been on TANF throughout all of the preceding months but has not yet
been sanctioned. As can be seen, the risk of sanction steadily decreases
throughout the TANF spell. Indeed, by month 5 of the spell the client’s
risk of sanction has decreased by nearly 50% compared to month 1.
Next, we examine the results for our control variables. As expected,
we find that sanctions are significantly related to clients’ individual traits
in both specifications of our model. Specifically, TANF sanctions are sig-
nificantly more likely to be applied to the small number of men in the
program, relative to the large majority of women. The probability of being
sanctioned is also higher for clients who are younger, who are heads of
two-parent families, who have older children, who are citizens, and who
possess less human capital (as measured by education level).
Moving to our contextual variables, sanctioning appears to be signifi-
cantly heavier in high-poverty counties with large populations, yet sig-
nificantly lower in counties with large TANF caseloads. We find weaker
effects for other aspects of the local economic context: neither unemploy-
ment rates nor local wage levels prove to be consistent predictors. Nor
do we find higher levels of minority presence in the community to affect
local sanctioning rates. In sum, these results are largely consistent with
the results of past studies and therefore give us greater confidence in the
results we report below (Westra and Routely 2000; Mancuso and Lindler
2001; Kalil et al. 2002; Hasenfeld et al. 2004; Keiser et al. 2004; Wu et
al. 2006).
Turning to an examination of our primary hypotheses, we begin with
the simple disparity hypothesis predicting that (1) the coefficients for Black
and Latino should be positive (reflecting significant black-white and La-
tino-white disparities in sanctioning), and (2) the coefficient for Black
should be larger than the coefficient for Latino (due to the presumed
larger gap in group reputations between blacks and whites). As specified,
equation (1) models the effects of Black/Latino as interactive, and there-
fore conditional, on spell duration and the local political environment. To
ease interpretation, we transformed Local Conservatism, Republican Vote
Share, and Month of Spell by subtracting their means prior to estimation,
so that the coefficients for Black and Latino in tables 1 and 2 reflect the
effects of race and ethnicity for clients who reside in a politically moderate
county and who are at a typical point in the TANF spell (month 3). As
can be seen from the coefficient estimates in table 1, we find mixed support
for the simple disparity hypothesis. The coefficients for Black are statis-
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Fig. 3.—Odds ratio of sanction for Florida TANF clients across the TANF spell (baseline
p month 1 of TANF spell).
tically insignificant in both specifications, and while the coefficient for
Latino is statistically significant, the direction of the effect is the opposite
of what is expected and suggests that Latino clients are sanctioned at a
rate that is lower than whites and blacks alike. While this is not what
we expected, we can think of at least two possible explanations for our
findings regarding the simple disparity hypothesis.
First, upon closer inspection, the sanctioning patterns we observe are
consistent with the trends in public opinion that we presented in figure
2. Based on the relationship between conservatism and the black and
Latino stereotype gaps, we see that stereotype gaps virtually disappear
among the most liberal respondents. Even more relevant, perhaps, when
we restrict the analysis presented in figure 2 to the states with the largest
Latino populations (California, Florida, and Texas), the stereotype gap
for Latinos actually reverses in direction among the most liberal respon-
dents (while the results for the black stereotype gap remain largely un-
changed).12 That is, in these states liberals actually view Latinos as more
“hard working” than whites. This result is presented in figure 4. Thus, to
the extent that public opinion informs our expectations about the prev-
12 We attempted to test this possibility by examining data from Florida in the NES,
but the sample size was simply too small (N p 58). However, if we pool the samples
from the three states with the largest Latino populations (California, Florida, and
Texas), we are able to achieve a reasonable sample size.
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Fig. 4.—Average gap in perceived laziness of racial groups, by ideological identification
of respondents (California, Florida, and Texas). Note: The vertical axis is the stereotype
gap and is computed as the difference in the mean assessment of laziness for each pair of
target groups (the mean score for blacks/Latinos minus the mean score for whites), where
the laziness scale is coded as follows: 1p hardworking, 7p lazy. As scaled, the stereotype
gap is a measure of the degree to which respondents view blacks (or Latinos) as lazier than
whites. The measure of conservatism is computed as the feeling thermometer score for
conservatives minus the score for liberals. The lines in the graph represent the predicted
relationship between conservatism and the stereotype gap for each group, based on a bi-
variate regression that utilizes pooled data from the National Election Study (1996, 2000,
2004), with the sample restricted to respondents in California, Florida, and Texas. Each
slope value is statistically significant (P ! .01).
alence of stereotypes in the most liberal regions in Florida, perhaps our
empirical results for Florida are not so unusual after all.
A second possible explanation for this finding is that the early months
of the spell may not fully reflect the exercise of discretion by welfare case
managers and administrators. Based on field interviews that we conducted
at all levels of the WT program, officials consistently reported that sanc-
tions recorded in the first months of a spell often represent a form of “self-
sanctioning” that is distinguishable from “true sanctioning” decisions made
by case managers. In this scenario, an applicant with some alternative
income options enters the official rolls, begins to receive assistance, but
then does not return to the local provider after learning what will be
required of them and how much cash aid they will receive in return. To
the extent that this dynamic is most prevalent among whites, perhaps
due to the greater availability of job market opportunities or assistance
from family members, evidence of simple racial disparities may be damp-
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ened to some unknown degree during the early months of the TANF spell.
If this is the case, the bias may be enough to push the sanction rate for
whites above that of blacks and Latinos in areas where the three groups
would otherwise be sanctioned at a more or less equal rate.13
By contrast, the results in table 1 offer strong support for the time-
contingent disparity hypothesis, as revealed by the significant interactions
between race/ethnicity of client and a simple counter variable (1–12) rep-
resenting the month of the current TANF spell (Black#Month of Spell,
Latino # Month of Spell). This interaction between race/ethnicity and
month of spell is extremely robust across both specifications of our model
and highlights the benefit of employing a longitudinal design, such as
event history analysis, to study racial dynamics in TANF sanctioning.
We now turn our attention to the ideology-contingent disparity hy-
pothesis, which predicts that sanctioning disparities are conditioned by
the local political environment in which TANF is implemented. Our test
of this hypothesis is based on the estimation of cross-level interactions
between the racial/ethnic status of the client and our measures of local
ideology (Local Conservatism in model 1 and Republican Vote Share in
model 2). The results reported in table 1 strongly support our hypothesis.
The effects of racial/ethnic status are indeed mediated by the ideological
orientation of the local political environment. Not only is this the case
regardless of which measure of local political ideology we use, we also
find the mediating effect of ideological climate to be statistically significant
for both black and Latino clients (although the effect is only weakly
significant for Latino clients in model 1). For both groups (blacks and
Latinos), movement from a liberal local environment to a conservative
environment raises the probability of being sanctioned, not just in absolute
terms but also relative to that of white non-Latinos.14 Given the complexity
of the results presented in table 1 (due to interactions between race, time,
and ideology), we present a series of graphical interpretations of these
effects below in figures 5 and 6.15
13 This explanation might also explain why we see this pattern in Florida, but we fail
to see it in the national data (as we report below). Florida’s WT program is especially
tough—not only does the WT program rely on the most severe type of sanction, but
sanctions are enforced in Florida at a rate that is very high compared to other states.
Thus, to the extent that this phenomenon of “self-sanctioning” is important, it is possible
that we will only observe it (to a significant degree) in the most punitive states.
14 One possible explanation for these results is that it is not ideology but rather the
size of the minority population that mediates the effect of client race on sanctioning.
To explore this possibility, we tested for interactions between racial/ethnic status of
client and the black and Latino percentage of the county population (i.e., Black #
%Black and Latino # %Latino). Neither term was statistically significant.
15 All illustrations are based on the results from table 1, model 1. Similar patterns are
observed when we use Republican Vote Share as our measure of local ideology.
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Fig. 5.—Predicted probability of being sanctioned for Florida TANF clients, by race,
local political environment, and month of TANF spell. Note: Ap month 3 of TANF spell,
B p month 6 of TANF spell, C p month 9 of TANF spell.
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Fig. 6.—Predicted probability of being sanctioned for Florida TANF clients, by ethnicity,
local political environment, and month of TANF spell. Note: Ap month 3 of TANF spell,
B p month 6 of TANF spell, C p month 9 of TANF spell.
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In figure 5 we present three graphs of the predicted probability of
sanction for “typical” black and white clients, for months 3, 6, and 9 of
the TANF spell.16 In each graph, the probability of sanction is plotted
against our measure of local conservatism, thus allowing us to see how
the risk of sanction varies across the entire range of local ideological
context for both black and white clients. Figure 5 reveals several inter-
esting features of the relationship between race and sanctioning. We can
see that as we move from month 3 to month 9 of the TANF spell, the
overall risk of sanction decreases for both blacks and whites (as reflected
by the decreasing intercept values of the curves in the graphs). This is
expected given the pattern of the baseline hazard reported in figure 1.
However, this decrease in the rate of sanctioning is not consistent across
racial groups. Moving from the third to the ninth month of the spell,
whites display a reduction of approximately 56% in the predicted rate of
sanction (for an ideologically moderate county), while the reduction for
blacks is only about 33%. This pattern of increasing black-white disparity
across the duration of the spell is anticipated given the significant inter-
action between race and month of spell in our results.
Figure 5 also allows us to see how black-white disparities in sanctioning
vary across the level of local conservatism. In all three graphs, we see
that as we move from the most liberal to the most conservative environ-
ments, the probability of a black client being sanctioned, relative to that
of a white client, increases. However, the pattern of racial disparities
changes in a substantively meaningful way as the spell length increases.
For clients in the third month of a TANF spell, we see that in liberal
counties, white clients are significantly more likely to be sanctioned than
black clients for a large majority of clients. Only in the most conservative
counties does the predicted probability of sanction for blacks exceed that
of whites. As the length of the spell grows longer, however, black clients
become consistently more likely to experience a sanction than their white
counterparts. Indeed, by the sixth month of the spell, in the most con-
servative counties the probability that a black client is sanctioned is pre-
dicted to be about 30% greater than that of a white client. By the ninth
month of the spell, black clients are predicted to be sanctioned more than
whites in every county and at a rate that is approximately 70% higher
than that of whites in the most conservative counties.
Figure 6 consists of three identically constructed graphs comparing
predicted probabilities for Latino clients and white clients. As can be seen,
16 We define a “typical” client as a U.S.-born, 31-year-old single woman with two
children (ages 5–12 years), fewer than 12 years of education, an average level of earned
income, and who resides in an average county (reflecting mean values on all of the
contextual variables).
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we observe several similarities between figures 5 and 6 in the pattern of
racial/ethnic disparities. The risk of sanction for a Latino client, relative
to that of a white client, increases as spell length increases and as one
moves from a liberal to a conservative political climate. However, the
magnitude of these changes in patterns of Latino-white disparities across
these two contexts seems smaller than what we observe for black clients
in figure 5. This is largely consistent with our theoretical assumptions re-
garding relatively smaller reputational gaps between Latinos and whites
(see fig. 2) and in this sense provides additional support for our hypotheses.17
Testing the Mediating Effect of Administrative Decentralization
Using National TANF Data
Thus far, our analysis of Florida TANF clients provides strong support
for our racial classification model of policy choice. Yet, due to our ex-
amination of a single state, we are unable to test hypothesis 4, which
predicts that the effects of race/ethnicity will be stronger in states that
rely on second-order devolution in TANF implementation. In addition,
there may be reason to doubt the external validity of our findings from
Florida due to our focus on sanctioning patterns in a single state. To
address these issues, we now turn to an analysis of sanctioning that in-
corporates individual-level data from all 50 states, available from the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) in
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
The ASPE data consist of a series of state samples of TANF families
collected by all 50 states from 1999 through 2005. These data are used
by the federal government for annual state performance evaluations and
consist of two types of samples—active cases and closed cases. In addition
to variables measuring clients’ personal characteristics, the closed case
samples also provide information concerning the reason that the case was
closed. Such reasons may include leaving welfare for employment, getting
married, and being sanctioned, among others. We therefore rely on these
data from the closed case samples to construct our dependent variable.
Given that we limit the analysis to closed cases, we expect to find some
differences compared to the Florida sample that includes open as well as
17 We have replicated the analyses presented in table 1 using two alternative estimation
techniques used to analyze multilevel data—logistic regression with clustered standard
errors (by county), and a two-stage regression method. These results confirm the in-
teraction between Black Client and Local Conservatism, but unlike the HGLM results,
we also find a significant interaction between Latino Client and Local Conservatism.
We do not present these results in this article, as we have the most confidence in the
HGLM results. However, we do provide these results for interested readers in the
online appendix.
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closed cases. Yet, there is reason to think that sanction exits in this pop-
ulation are affected as we have hypothesized. For our analysis, we pool
all closed case samples for the entire 1999–2005 period. We restrict our
analysis to all adult TANF recipients who were identified as the head of
the household by the state. Using this definition, and accounting for some
missing data, our final data set consists of approximately 195,000 TANF
adults residing in nearly 2,700 different counties. Unfortunately, these data
are purely cross-sectional in nature, and therefore we cannot exactly rep-
licate our analysis of sanctioning in Florida using nationally representative
data. However, these data do allow us to provide a strong test of the
effects of decentralized administration, as well as a limited replication of
our tests of the simple disparity hypothesis and the ideology-contingent
disparity hypothesis.
Our dependent variable is Sanction Exitjk—a dichotomous variable that
indicates whether or not client j, residing in county k, left TANF due to
a sanction. We model the probability of a sanction exit as a function of
both individual-level and contextual (county) variables. Therefore, we
estimate a (cross-sectional) multilevel model, using a logit link (as our
dependent variable is dichotomous). The individual-level (level 1) model
is represented below in equation (6).
Sanction Exit p b  b Black  b Latino  b No. Children (2)jk 0k 1k j 2k j 3k j
b No. Children (3 or more)4k j
b Age of Youngest Child (3 mos. 2 yrs.)5k j
( )b Age of Youngest Child 3 4 yrs.6k j
( )b Age of Youngest Child 5 11 yrs.7k j
b Age of Youngest Child (12 or more)8k j
b Education (12 yrs.)  b Education (1 12 yrs.) (6)9k j 10k j
b Male  b Citizen  b Age11k j 12k j 13k j
b Single Parent  b Earned Income14k j 15k j
b Public Housing  b OASDI  b SSI16k j 17k j 18k j
b Year 2000  b Year 200119k j 20k j
b Year 2002  b Year 200321k j 22k j
b Year 2004  b Year2005 .23k j 24 j
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The county-level (level 2) model is represented below in equations (7)–
(10).
b p g  g Republican Vote Share  g %Black0k 00 01 k 02 k
g %Latino  g Per Capita Income (7)03 k 04 k
g Unemployment Rate  e ,05 k 0k
b p g  g Republican Vote Share  e , (8)1k 10 11 k 1k
b p g  g Republican Vote Share  e , (9)2k 20 21 k 2k
b p g , for pp 3 24. (10)pk p0
Level 1 Hypotheses
To test the simple disparity hypothesis, we once again classify clients as
black, Latino, and white (non-Latino) and include the dichotomous var-
iables Black and Latino. We expect that the coefficient values will be
positive for each of these variables (b1, b2 1 0) and the coefficient for Black
will be larger than the coefficient for Latino (b1 1 b2).
We also include a number of other variables to control for variation in
clients’ individual characteristics. Many of these variables are identical
(or very similar) to the variables we included in our analysis of Florida
TANF clients, so we do not provide a detailed description of justification
for their inclusion.18 These include variables measuring the client’s gender
(Male), citizenship status (Citizen), age (Age), age of the youngest child
in the TANF family, the number of children in the TANF family, the
client’s marital status (Single Parent), and two indicators of human capital
(Earned Income and Education). We also take advantage of information
in the national TANF data set and include three additional indicators of
client hardship. These include two dichotomous variables indicating
whether a former TANF client received disability benefits through the
Social Security or Supplemental Security Income programs (OASDI, SSI)
and whether a TANF family lived in public housing (Public Housing).
Finally, we include a series of dummy variables for the year that the
TANF sample was collected.
18 Details for these variables, including measurement, data sources, and descriptive
statistics, are provided in the online appendix.
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Level 2 Hypotheses
As in our analysis of Florida TANF clients, we model the intercept of
equation (6) (b0k) as a function of local political, economic, and social
conditions. To measure the local political context in the national data, we
rely on the Republican share of the two-party presidential vote, averaged
over the past three presidential elections (Republican Vote Share). We also
control for the local racial context by including the percentage of the
county population that is black and Latino, respectively (%Black, %La-
tino). To capture the effects of local economic conditions, we include the
county unemployment rate (Unemployment Rate) and per capita income
(Per Capita Income). Finally, we test the ideology-contingent disparity
hypothesis by including Republican Vote Share as a predictor for the
effects of Black (b1k) and Latino (b2k), as reflected in equations (8) and (9).
As we expect racial disparities to be larger in conservative counties, we
expect g11 and g21 to be positive.
To test hypothesis 4 (the decentralization-contingent disparity hypoth-
esis), we estimate our model separately for the 36 state governments that
administer TANF directly and the 14 states that have devolved significant
authority in TANF implementation to local governments or regional
workforce boards—that is, states with second-order devolution (Gains-
borough 2003).19 For reasons outlined above, we expect that the effects
of racial classification may be enhanced in SOD states, and, as a result,
racial classification may more likely to result in racial disparities in sanc-
tioning outcomes.
Results
The results of our analyses are presented in table 2. Once again, we find
that sanctions are significantly related to clients’ individual traits, within
both SOD and centralized (i.e., non-SOD) states. The probability of being
sanctioned is higher for clients who are younger, have older children (SOD
states only), are citizens, and possess less human capital (as measured by
education level and earned income). These results are generally consistent
across SOD and non-SOD states, and they are generally consistent with
our results from Florida. However, the effects of several variables diverge
from our initial findings from Florida. For example, gender plays no role
in sanctioning in SOD states, and in centralized states it is women, as
opposed to men, who are more likely to be sanctioned. In addition, while
being a single parent has no effect on sanctioning in SOD states, we find
19 These 14 states include Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wis-
consin.
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that single parents are more likely (rather than less likely) to be sanctioned
in centralized states. Finally, we see that clients who receive disability
benefits or live in public housing are significantly more likely to have left
TANF due to a sanction, perhaps reflecting significant employment bar-
riers among these clients.
Moving to our contextual variables, sanction exits are significantly more
likely to occur in counties with larger black populations, as well as in
counties with larger Latino populations (in centralized states). We find
weaker effects for the local economic context, although the unemployment
rate is positively related to sanction exits in centralized states.
We now turn our attention to the tests of the simple disparity and
ideology-contingent disparity hypotheses and the relative performance of
these hypotheses across SOD and centralized administrative environ-
ments. As in our initial analysis of TANF sanctioning among Florida
clients, we centered Republican Vote Share by subtracting its mean so
that the coefficients for Black and Latino in table 2 reflect the effects of
race and ethnicity in a typical (i.e., politically moderate) county. As we
saw in Florida, the results for the national data find the effects of race
and ethnicity to be insignificant in such a county, in both SOD and non-
SOD states. However, this does not mean to suggest that racial disparities
are entirely absent, as evidenced by the results of our test of the ideology-
contingent hypothesis. As in our Florida analysis, our test of this hy-
pothesis is based on the estimation of cross-level interactions between the
racial/ethnic status of the client and our measure of local ideology (Re-
publican Vote Share). Among black clients, the effect of racial status is
indeed mediated by the ideological orientation of the local political en-
vironment. And consistent with theoretical expectations concerning the
nature of the implementation environment, the effect is limited to SOD
states. However, we find no interaction between ethnicity (Latino) and
the local political environment in either sample of states.
In figure 7, we provide a graphical illustration of the relationship be-
tween race and sanctioning in SOD states that offers a clearer under-
standing of exactly how this relationship is mediated by local ideology.
Figure 7 presents the predicted probability of a sanction exit for a typical
client by the race of the client and the local political environment.20 As
we saw in Florida (see fig. 5), black clients and white clients are predicted
to be sanctioned at more or less equivalent rates in liberal and moderate
counties. But as we move to the right along the horizontal axis, we see
20 We define a “typical” client as a U.S.-born, 31-year-old single woman with two
children (ages 5–12 years), fewer than 12 years of education, and an average level of
earned income, who resides in an average county (reflecting mean values on all of the
contextual variables).
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Fig. 7.—Predicted probability of sanction in second-order devolution states, by race of
client and local political environment. Note: Predicted probabilities were calculated based
on the results presented in table 2 for the second-order devolution sample of states.
that racial disparities quickly emerge in the anticipated direction. Indeed,
in the most conservative counties the predicted probability of a sanction
exit is approximately 70% greater for blacks than it is for whites. Given
the consistency of this finding across two very different data sets and
research designs, this result provides important confirmation of the me-
diating effects of local ideology and administrative decentralization, and
ultimately, our racial classification model of policy choice.
CONCLUSION
Poverty governance in the United States has been redefined over the past
several decades to emphasize decentralized systems of disciplinary en-
gagement with the poor. More muscular approaches to paternalism and
correctional control have intersected with neoliberal reforms emphasizing
devolution, privatization, and quasi-market performance pressures. As
Loı¨c Wacquant (2009) rightly argues, penal logics and policing (in a broad
sense) have been extended from the field of criminal justice to the op-
erations of welfare programs. As a facet of poverty governance, the state’s
carceral “right hand” has not only risen in relative importance, it has
provided a new logic for the state’s “left hand” of social welfare provision.
This new system has profound implications for status, power, and mar-
ginality among the mostly female and disproportionately nonwhite people
enrolled in welfare programs today. Like their predominantly male coun-
terparts under correctional control, poor women on welfare are subject
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to a disciplinary regime where penalties for noncompliance loom large
and resources to counter social and economic marginality remain difficult
to access.
Our study has yielded substantial evidence for Wacquant’s core claims
regarding the disciplinary turn in welfare provision and the centrality of
race for contemporary poverty governance. Earlier research has dem-
onstrated that state policy choices under welfare reform have produced
a tight triadic relationship linking higher black population rates, more
disciplinary and localized TANF regimes, and more aggressive correc-
tional control (Soule and Zylan 1997; Soss et al. 2001; Soss et al. 2008;
Waquant 2009). In the present study, we have shifted the focus from state
policy choices to local implementation efforts. The evidence presented in
this article has underscored that racial classifications continue to shape
the operations of poverty governance at all levels of the U.S. system.
In this respect, our study aligns closely with Wacquant’s analysis of
contemporary poverty governance. Our approach to analysis, however,
has also yielded important differences. Where Wacquant offers a sweeping
historical interpretation of national developments, we pay closer attention
to how policies and practices vary across jurisdictions, institutions, and
circumstances. The disciplinary turn has not unfolded in a uniform man-
ner across the nation, and this observation is central to understanding
the racial basis of disciplinary governance. American federalism functions
today as a powerful mechanism for the production of racial disparities.
Under first-order devolution, several studies have shown that states with
larger black populations have adopted the most disciplinary polices and,
as a result, African-Americans have been subjected to the most disci-
plinary regimes. Similarly, our results show that second-order devolution
has paved the way for a complex interplay of political conservatism and
racial bias in welfare sanctioning—a dynamic that does not appear in
states that have retained more centralized control. These and related
patterns underscore the contingency of racial dynamics in poverty gov-
ernance today and highlight how institutional structures play a critical
mediating role.
Our study also differs from past analyses, including Waquant’s, in that
it offers a more subtle and contingent account of how race matters for
the implementation of punitive policy tools within the new system of
poverty governance. Unlike broad models of racial control and prejudice,
the RCM emphasizes, and our empirical results confirm, that racial dis-
parities are far more likely to arise in some circumstances than in others.
As we have seen, racial disparities in welfare sanctioning have been highly
contingent on the structure of governing arrangements, the character of
local political environments, the presence of stereotype-consistent mark-
ers, and relative differences in group reputations. Indeed, under some
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conditions specified here, black and Latino welfare recipients emerge as
no more likely, or even less likely, than their white counterparts to be
sanctioned. Minority disadvantage arises in the disciplinary process pri-
marily as a function of community and client characteristics that heighten
the degree of contrast associated with racial-group reputations, including
stereotypes associated with nonwhite women taking welfare for extended
periods.
In the welfare context, long-term program usage is a discrediting mark
that can associate a recipient with dependency, irresponsibility, and lack
of effort. The toll imposed by this discrediting mark, however, turns out
to vary across racial groups in our analysis. As TANF participation spells
grow longer, it is minority, and especially black, clients who become in-
creasingly subject to penalties. This result is consistent not only with the
RCM but also with a line of experimental research suggesting that welfare
reliance has different meanings when attached to blacks and whites (Gi-
lens 1999) and that stigmatizing, stereotype-consistent cues interact with
racial status to disadvantage blacks relative to whites (Valentino et al.
2002; Pager 2003). In the Florida WT program, black-white disparities
increase over the course of the participation spell, suggesting that blacks
are disproportionately tainted by—and ultimately taxed for—the stigma
of long-term program usage.
Likewise, we find that racial disparities in sanctioning depend signifi-
cantly on local context. Larger disparities emerge in more ideologically
conservative jurisdictions and within states that delegate significant dis-
cretion to local decision makers through second-order devolution. Our
interpretation of these results flows, once again, from the basic premises
of the RCM. According to this model, racial disparities in policy treatment
should emerge to a greater degree in those times and places where officials
are more likely to hold stereotypes that distinguish racial groups in policy-
relevant ways, and where such officials are afforded a greater opportunity
to translate those beliefs into policy outcomes.
These findings have immediate relevance for public policy, as well as
broader implications for the history of welfare provision. Our results com-
plement other studies of welfare sanctioning that find that frontline work-
ers exercise considerable discretion in the implementation of sanctions
and often do so in a way that is inconsistent with policy intent (Lens
2006). Numerous studies have also found that sanctions do little to im-
prove the lives of welfare families and may actually cause additional stress
and disadvantage (Pavetti et al. 2003; Meyers et al. 2006). Our results
add additional justification to arguments that policy makers should con-
sider redesigning sanctions as a policy tool, or at the very least consider
adding some safeguards to help insure that sanctions are administered in
a nondiscriminatory and less arbitrary fashion. Examples of such mea-
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sures might include the use of explicit performance measures that monitor
the racial distribution of sanctions (Gooden 2003) and efforts to promote
awareness of and participation in the sanction appeal process (Lens 2008).
Finally, we end with a broader point about the history of welfare pro-
vision. Scholars have often suggested that welfare has followed a “vicious
cycle” in which social inequalities have shaped policy choices that, in turn,
have recreated social inequalities (Lieberman 1998; Mettler 1998; Schram
2006). Negative images of target groups guide policy design and imple-
mentation, and policy designs are then implemented in ways that reinforce
negative group outcomes and reputations (Schneider and Ingram 1993;
Schram 1995, 2005). The analysis presented here raises the prospect that
such dynamics may be at work today in contemporary welfare reform.
Racial politics contributed greatly to federal welfare reform in 1996 (Gilens
1999; Soss et al., in press), which devolved substantial policy authority
to the states. State choices regarding TANF program design were then
significantly influenced by racial composition and resulted in black fam-
ilies being disproportionately concentrated in the policy regimes with the
toughest rules and sanctions (Soss et al. 2001; Fellowes and Rowe 2004)
and the most decentralized administrative systems (Soss et al. 2008). In
this article, we show how these dynamics converge and repeat at the local
level. The decentralized administrative structure possible under welfare
reform facilitates the ideologically specific production of racial disparities
in sanction implementation. As a result, today, as in the past, public aid
for poor women and children remains entangled with the complex inter-
play of race, politics, and local policy control.
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